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IN THE SUPRE~ffi COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAN ANDREWS 1 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16168 
LAWRENCE NORRIS, as Warden 
of the Utah State Prison, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTORY STATENENT 
It has been respondent's position consistently 
that all issues raised in appellant's petition for habeas 
corpus in the lower court were purely legal in nature and 
could be disposed of as matters of law. Thus, respondent 
moved to dismiss the petition alternatively on the merits 
and on the basis of the waiver doctrine. This Court 
agreed with respondent and, although disposing of the 
petition on the waiver doctrine, additionally reached 
the merits and ruled on them as a matter of law. 
Therefore, contrary to appellant's contention in his 
petition for rehearing that no "full hearing" has ever 
been granted, respondent submits that th.is Court, by 
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dealing fully and completely with all issues asserted by 
appellant after full briefing of those issues and oral 
argument thereon, has effectively accorded appellant . 
full opportunity to argue the legal merits of his claims 
in the numerous proceedings up to this present petition for 
rehearing. Thus, a full hearing or airing of the issues has 
been allowed. 
As for appellant's argument that he has been 
requesting a continuance throughout this entire proceeding, 
the record of the November 29-30, 1978, habeas corpus 
hearing clearly reflects that no such continuance was 
requested. Appellant never asked for additional time to 
prepare for argument on the respondent's motion to dismiss. 
Respondent fails to see where a continuance was requested 
by appellant on pages 26-27, 29 of the November 30, 1978, 
transcript, although vague references were made as to the 
need to brief some of the issues addressed at the hearing. 
This was done when appellant appealed the dismissal of his 
habeas corpus petition to this Court. Appellant is now 
presenting a duplicative argument of these issues again 
here. 
Finally, ~t the outset, respondent submits that 
the sound, universally-accepted criteria for determining 
whether a factual evidentiary hearing is necessary has 
-2-
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been observed in this case. In Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 
578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), ~·denied 440 u.s. 976 
(1979), the Court ruled that such hearings are only proper 
when factual issues, as to the facts in the case itself, 
are in question. The Court held: 
• . if only questions of law 
are involved, an evidentiary hearing 
to develop fully the facts underlying 
a petitioner's complaints would be 
pointless. 
578 F.2d at 590. 
This court recognized and adopted this standard 
in the present case. In Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed 
February 13, 1980, this Court held: 
. where it affirmatively appears 
from the petition that a petitlcner is 
not entitled to the writ, an evldentlary 
hearing is unnecessary. Hence, if the 
petition raises legal questions only, an 
evidentiary hearing to fully develop the 
underlying facts would be pointless, and is 
not required. 
Advance sheet, at page 7. Respondent submits that this 
view is correct and continues to be so at this stage of 
the rehearing process as well. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS NOT RAISED ANY ISSUES WHICH 
\"OULD JUSTIFY A REHEARING IN THIS MATTER. 
In cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 
619 (1913), this Court noted: 
'-. 
-3-
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When this court • . • has considered and 
decided all of the material questions involved 
in a case, a rehearing should not be applied 
for, unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material or facts, or have overlooked 
some statute or decision which may affect tbe 
result, or that we have based the decision 
on some wrong principle of law, or have 
either misapplied or overlooked something 
which materially affects the result. 
!d. at 624 (emphasis_ added). 
The Court had much earlier noted that a rehearing 
would not be allowed where the petitioner sought merely 
to reargue the case and presented no new facts or law. 
Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 483, 11 Pac. 618 at 619 (1886). 
See also Yearian v. Spiers, 4 Utah 482, 11 Pac. 618 (1886). 
The standards set forth in these cases is repeated and 
explained in more recent decisions from other jurisdictions. 
In Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A.2d 793 at 796 
(1968), the court said: 
Supreme Court Rule 71 states, inter alia, 
that the petition for reargument "must specify 
particuarly the point supposed to have been 
overlooked or misapprehended by the Court." 
Certainly, it cannot be said that our Court 
"misapprehended" the Pointer claim, since 
it was never in fact ra~sed. Furthermore, 
we believe that a proper interpretation of 
the term "overlooked" in the rule would 
require a showing that our Court failed to 
consider some finding of fact or proposition 
of law relevant to the disposition of an issue 
actually raised by the parties. It does not 
mean that reargument may be granted simply 
because one of the parties "overlooked" a 
relevant issue. Thus, in the present case, 
-4-
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since Cheeks' petition failed to show either 
that the Court misapprehended or overlooked 
any point raised in his appeal, the petition 
was properly denied without ever reaching 
the merits of the Pointer claim therein 
asserted. (Emphasis 1n original~) 
In Sarmiento v. State, 371 So.2d 1047 at 1053 (Fla. App. 
1979), the Florida court rejected the State's petition for 
rehearing stating: 
[The] •.• argument, however, was 
never raised by the state either in its 
main brief or on oral argument in this cause 
and was in no way overlooked by this court. 
It cannot, therefore, be raised for the 
first time on a motion for rehearing. 
See also Davis v. State, 400 A.2d 292 at 299 (Del. 1979). 
Finally, in United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152 
at 1158 (5th Cir. 1970), the court rejected a peL~Llo~ for 
rehearing and said: 
The point was not raised in the 
court below nor has it been previously 
raised in this court. Having tried and 
appealed its case on one theory, an 
unsuccessful party may not then use a petition 
for rehearing as a device to test a new theory. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
Clearly, new issues may not be raised via petition 
for rehearing. Moreover, a petition for rehearing should 
not be used to re-present arguments "based upon later 
discovered and subsequent authority." Ash v. State, 560 
P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1977). Rehearings should only be granted 
when the court has misconstrued or misapplied the facts 
-5-
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or the law as presented and argued on appeal. As this 
Court said in Beaver County v. Howe Indemnity Co., 
88 Utah 1, 52 P.2d 435 (1935): 
If an opinion is to be modified 
it should be modified because it fails 
to correctly state the law, or for some 
other reason which makes its language 
or statements improper or inapplicable. 
Id. at 459. 
In Ash v. State, supra at 370, the dissenting 
opinion noted further that no rehearing should be granted 
unless there is a reasonable probability that the court 
may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion or overlooked 
some important matter necessary to a correct decision. 
Applying these standards to the instant petition, 
respondent submits that no rehearing should be allowed. 
Appellant challenges this court's decision on a number of 
grounds, all of which have either been specifically 
considered or never raised. A careful reading of 
appellant's brief discloses the fact that all the 
issues raised have or could have been dealt with within 
the regular appellate processes and should not now be 
considered via a petition for rehearing. 
In Point I appellant argues, first, that not 
all of appellant's claims were addressed by this Court's 
opinion. It is clear, nevertheless, that, given the 
-6-
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action of this Court in affirming the dismissal of 
appellant's habeas corpus complaint, this Court rejected 
all of appellant's claims. Appellant does not indicate 
any instance wherein this Court has affirmatively 
misconstrued or misstated the law with respect to 
these claims or arrived at an improper conclusio~. 
This Court is simply being asked to consider the same 
issues over again. There is no reasonable probability 
that such a consideration will produce a different 
result. 
Appellant argues, further, in Point I, that the 
recent decision of State v. Brown, No. 15481, filed 
February 7, 1980, is inconsistent with the court's oplnion 
in this matter. The specific issues addressed by State v. 
Brown have never been raised in this case and should not 
be considered at this stage. See Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 
Sarmiento v. State and United States v. Sutherland, all 
(See a full discussion of State v. Brown, ~.) 
In his second point, although appellant claims 
that the court's opinion "misconstrues the record," 
appellant also fails to raise a claim which justifies 
a rehearing. This court has considered the record in this 
matter on several different occasions. Appellant does no 
more in this instance than to disagree with the Court on 
what the testimony reveals the facts to be. Although he 
-7-
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points to portions of the record which, he says, 
indicate mistakes in the Court's characterization of the 
facts, the Court's conclusions may also be supported by 
references to the record. Moreover, appellant specifically 
raised the question of proof of his direct involvement 
in the killings in the previous appeal (see Andrews v. Morris, 
Brief of Appellant at p. 22). His claim in this instance 
amounts to nothing more than a request for this Court to 
reverse itself on an issue already considered explictly. 
Appellant has not shown that this Court affirmatively 
misconstrued the facts nor has he raised a reasonable 
possibility that the Court might reverse itself. 
Appellant's third point also fails to demonstrate 
a mistake which would necessitate a rehearing. He points 
to no law or facts which were misconstrued but argues, 
instead, that "a growing body of literature" (Appellant's 
Brief at p. 12) is in conflict with the conclusion of 
this Court. Again, no reasonable likelihood of reversal 
is raised because of a demonstrated misappalication of law 
or fact. 
In summary, a rehearing should only be granted 
when it is demonstrated that the Court has misconstrued 
the facts or misapplied the law with respect to issues 
raised and considered on appeal. Rehearings should 
not be forums for the consideration of issues never 
before raised, nor should arguments al~~ady made and 
-8-
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rejected be reconsidered. Appellant has failed to 
demonstrate a reasonable possibility that this Court 
would reverse itself because of any error in 
application of law or fact to issues considered in 
the previous appeal of this matter. A rehearing should 
not be allowed. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT HAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL 
OF APPELLANT' S CLAIMS RELATIVE TO THE 
ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
UTAH DEATH PENALTY AND SUCH CONSIDERATION 
IS FURTHERMORE CONSISTENT WITH STATE V. BROWN. 
Respondent submits that the majority of the issues 
appellant is now raising have been fully dealt with in the 
several proceedings prior to this present action. For the 
Court's convenience, respondent will summarize these 
issues as argued in appellant's brief, Point I and then 
indicate where the issue has been previously ruled on: 
1. sentencing authority has "unguided and 
unfettered discretion" to choose which defendant will be 
sentenced to death--State v. Pierre, appellant's brief 
(appellant Andrews adopted the bulk of appellant Pierre's 
brief) at pages 14-15; State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1345; 
Andrews v. Utah, appellant's petition for certiorari to the 
Supreme court of the United States, at pages 27-29 (~. 
den. Oct. 2, 1978); Andrews v. Morris, appellant's amended 
'-. 
-9-
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petition for habeas corpus, at page 4; Andrews v. Morris, 
appellant's brief, at page 21; and Andrews v. Morris, 
No. 16168, filed Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 9-10 (advance 
sheet) • 
2. sentencing authority not required to make 
findings--Andrews v. Utah, appellant's petition for 
certiorari, at pages 15-18; Andrews v. Morris, 
appellant's amended petition for habeas corpus, at page 
4; Andrews v. Morris, appellant's brief, at page 21; and 
Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed February 13, 1980, at 
page 10. 
3. aggravating circumstances not pled by the 
state, found by the jury or specified in the verdict--
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1345; Andrews v. Utah, 
appellant's petition for certiorari, at page 15; Andrews 
v. Morris, amended petition for habeas corpus, at page 
5; Andrews v. Morris, appellant's brief at page 21; and 
Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed February 13, 1980 
at page 10. 
4. aggravating circumstances were not limited 
to those enumerated by the state--State v. Pierre, 
appellant's brief at page 16; State v. Pierre, 5i2 P.2d 
at 1345; Andrews v. Utah, appellant's petition for 
certiorari, at pages 29-31; Andrews v. Morris, amended 
petition for habeas corpus, at pages 5-6; Andrews v. 
Morris, appellant's brief, at pages 20-21; and Andrews 
'·. 
-10-
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v. Morris, No. 16168, filed February 13, 1980, at pages 
9-10. 
5. no standards to guide jury (see infra on 
State v. Brown discussion)--State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at. 
1345; Andrews v. Utah, appellant's petition for certiorari, 
at pages 15-18; Andrews v. Morris, amended petition for 
habeas corpus, at pages 6-7; Andrews v. Morris, appellant's 
brief, at page 21; and Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed 
Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 9-10. 
6. insufficient record for this Court's review--
Andrews v. Morris, amended petition for habeas corpus, 
at pages 8-9; Andrews v, Morris, appellant's brief, at 
pages ll-14; and Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, f::_::.2~ 
Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 7-8. 
Furthermore, in addition to the above references 
wherein these issues have been addressed, respondent 
makes these additional observations: as to (2) there 
is no need for the lower court to make findings where 
the transcript of the penalty phase is available for 
review; as to (3) the jury does not need to find each 
aggravating circumstance unanimously; no United States 
Supreme Court case requires this; as to (4) it is totally 
permissible to allow evidence of aggravating circumstances 
other than those statutorily specified; and as to (5), 
Jurek v. Texas, 429 U.S. 875 (1976), upholds the Texas 
death penalty which statute does not raBuire additional 
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written findings to be made after a guilty verdict to 
support a death sentence, contrary to appellant's 
assertion. 
Thus, as outlined in Point I, this petition 
may not be granted inasmuch as these above issues have 
been exhaustively dealt with by this Court and the United 
States Supreme Court. These issues simply have been 
raised and considered. 
Appellant argues in Point I that the evidence 
presented at sentencing phase was made with a "total 
lack of restrictions • . • so that . • • not even 
constitutional evidentiary limitations were observed. 
Respondent submits that the evidence presented by the 
State at sentencing was, in fact, not only properly 
within the bounds of constitutional guidelines but, 
furthermore, was very minimal. The State put on three 
witnesses: Dr. Louis G. Moench, a psychiatrist, who 
examined appellant Pierre and testified he was able to 
distinguish between right and wrong and that he had found 
no evidence of any mental disease or defect in appellant 
Pierre (Tr.4129-2137); Lt. John Regni, the Hill Air 
Force Base personnel officer who testified regarding 
appellants'Andrews and Pierre work records and 
disciplinary measures taken against them (Tr.4137-4161); 
-12-
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and Allen Roe, a clinical psychologist at the utah 
State Prison who testified as to the average time served 
by inmates who have been sentenced to life imprisonment_ 
(Tr.4162-4194). Also the State had read into the 
record a letter from the Bexar County, Texas, Adult 
Probation Office, which revoked appellant Andrews' 
Parole. The State then rested. 
Appellant relies on Smith v. Estelle, 602 
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that 
appellants were not given adequate notice of the 
State's inculpatory or aggravating evidence. However, 
the facts of Smith are starkly distinguishable frorr. ~je 
facts in this matter. In Smith a petition for habeas 
corpus was successful where the petitioner's claim of 
unfair surprise--a psychiatrist's testimony during the penalty 
phase --was deemed a substantial denial of his rights. 
The prosecution in Smith had, according to the court, 
"intentionally omitted Dr. Grigson's name from the witness 
list," Id., at 702,and such action left the petitioner "at 
best, not fully prepared." Id. Another important factor 
in Smith is that the petitioner was never informed that the 
examination he had with Dr. Grigson "concerned more than 
Smith's competence to stand trial." Id. at 703. Rather, 
the examination was employed to gather additional evidence 
to support the State's capital case. 
'-, 
-13-
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In the present matter the intended use of 
Dr. Moench's testimony was clearly a known fact. 
The psychiatrist here, in fact, was initially 
employed by the appellant Pierre (Tr.4130), and the 
trial court eventually ordered an examination as well. 
A discussion was had, out of the presence of the jury 
(Tr.4129-4134), wherein appellant contended that the 
information garnered from the doctor's interview with 
appellant Pierre was the work product of counsel and 
that his testimony could not be entered without 
appellant's consent (Tr.4130). The court ruled that 
Dr. Moench could only testify concerning his general 
impression as to appellant's sanity and that any 
additional facts derived from the examination would be 
protected under an attorney work product privilege and/or 
a doctor-patient privilege (Tr.4133-4134). 
In open court, Dr. Moench testified very 
generally, as ordered by the court at appellant's 
insistence, as to appellant Pierre's ability to 
distinguish right and wrong both legally and morally 
(Tr.4135-4136) and that appellant Pierre did not have 
any mental defect or illness (Tr.4136). 
The other two state witnesses were likewise 
not of the Smith type. Appellant had notice of their 
-14-
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being intended witnesses and no objections as to surprise 
were made by appellant. Thus, respondent contends that 
no Smith v. Estelle issue is present in the instant matter 
and that a review of Smith shows that the notice defect 
there is absent here. Appellant had notice of all 
statutory aggravating circumstances as well as the 
witnesses the State intended to call at the penalty phase. 
It should also be noted that the United States Supreme 
Court granted the State of Texas' petition for certiorari in 
the Smith case earlier this month. Thus, the question of the 
use of such psychiatric testimony at the penalty phase 
is presently under review by that Court. 
Appellant next asserts that juries s~s~ld -ot 
be permitted to sentence a convicted murderer to life 
or death "without even saying why. . " (Appellant's Brief 
at page 4). Such an approach, however, is too mechanical. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 238 (1972), simply requires that 
a state have procedures which guarantee that the death 
penalty is not unbridled or freakish in its application 
so as to minimize the risk of arbitrary jury reactions. 
Respondent has repeatedly shown that the State of Utah's 
death penalty statute has such guarantees. The present 
system, furthermore, provides that a transcript of the 
evidence presented at the penalty phase be available to ensure 
a convicted person of an accurate and fair review on appeal. It 
-15-
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remains, though, a fact of judicial life that absolute 
certainty can never be achieved regarding what actually 
motivates a jury to impose a death sentence. Jury 
deliberations are not recorded and, consequently, the 
deliberative process remains a sacred secret in any 
state's system, including those of Georgia, Florida 
and Texas, which have been expressly upheld by the United 
States Supreme court. 
Respondent takes issue with appellant's 
characterization of the jury's sole guideline in this 
case as being what the jurors "found 'appropriate'". 
A review of the jury instructions (Tr.4272-4277) reveals 
that the court emphasized that "the burden of proof to 
satisfy the jury that a death sentence is appropriate 
is on the State." (Tr.4273). In instruction number 4, 
the court enumerated the factors the jury would consider 
in determining what the proper sentence should be in 
the case (see Tr.4274-4275). Instruction number 6 
stated that each defendant's culpability must be judged 
independently and that each sentence must be separately 
supported (Tr.4275-4276). 
Thus to characterize the instructions as being 
based "only on what the jury found 'appropriat<e'" is 
a gross misstatement. (Appellant's brief at page 4.) 
-16-
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The major thrust of appellant's Point I is 
that this Court's recent decision in State v. Brown, 
No. 15481, filed Feb. 7, 1980 (six (6) days before 
the Court's decision here) allegedly sets forth new 
standards which affect appellant's sentence. Appellant 
contends that evidence was admitted at the penalty 
phase in violation of Brown; specifically: penological 
theory and religious opinion, evidence of appellant's work 
performance and mental health which allegedly included 
hearsay on hearsay and factually inaccurate 
testimony. (See discussion, supra, as per the mental 
status evidence argument.) Respondent will comment-·' 
each of these purportedly improper testimonies. 
The evidence regarding penological theory and 
religious opinion was presented by Gerald Smith and 
Frazier Crocker, respectively, both of whom were called 
as defense witnesses (Tr.4198-4231;4234-4247). Respondent 
submits that if this evidence was inappropriate the 
responsibility for such error lies with appellant--not 
respondent. Furthermore, although the respondent finds 
the evidence of little relevance to the questions before 
the jury at the penalty phase, nonetheless, the evidence 
presented was not inflammatory or prejudicial as was the 
improper evidence at issue in Brown. Thus, this evidence 
-17-
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cannot adversely affect the sentence in the present case. 
The testimony appellant alleges included hearsay 
on hearsay and which contained factually inaccurate ev~dence 
also fails to meet the Brown prohibition. Appellant cites 
to Lt. John Regni's testimony as an example of hearsay on 
hearsay (Tr.4142-4148). This cite refers to the testimony 
Lt. Regni offered regarding appellant's work record at 
Hill Air Force Base. Lt. Regni testified from the official 
records, Unfavorable Information File (Tr.4141), of all 
disciplinary action taken against appellant (Tr.4137-4140). 
These actions were three letters of reprimand, an "Article 
15" action (discipline in lieu of court martial) and a 
vacation of the suspended reduction in appellant's 
classification to a grade E-1, airman basic (Tr.4142-4145). 
Such evidence as a record made in the regular course of 
business, is clearly an exception to the hearsay rule (see 
Rule 63 (13), Utah Rules of Evidence). Furthermore, 
appellant's only objection to this information--that Lt. 
Regni was not the custodian of the records (Tr.4141,4148)--
was specifically refuted by the State. In response to a 
question, "~'lho keeps those files?", Lt. Regni testified, 
"Sir, I do. I am the custodian for them" (Tr.4150). 
The hearsay on hearsay claim must therefore be 
rejected. The similar claim in Brown is much different. 
In Brown a State's witness testified at,penalty phase 
-18-
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that he heard a declarant testify in another case that 
defendant Brown had stated, "I just head-shot two 
f------ for messing with my brother." State v. Brown, 
at page 11. Actually, defendant did make the comment 
but it did not include the inflammatory, prejudicial 
obscenity. "Hearsay on admissible hearsay", ~at p. 
14, was the additional, crucial factor which led this 
Court to reduce Brown's sentence to life imprisonment. 
Neither of these factors is present in the instant 
matter: the hearsay was admissible; no prejudicial 
evidence, as per Brown, was presented. 
One additional factor must be considered as 
to appellant's contention that State v. Brown has affect 
on this present case. The court in Brown refers frequently 
to the fact that: 
in capital cases, this Court, 
sua sponte, considers manifest and prejudicial 
error though such error may neither be 
assigned nor argued, combine to provide for 
a comprehensive review of the entire case, 
including the sentence of death, to determine 
if that sentence resulted from prejudice or 
arbitrary action or was disproportionate 
and excessive in relation to the offense 
for which defendant was convicted. 
Advance sheet, at pages 9-10 (emphasis added}. This 
principle was first announced in State v. Stenback, 
78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931). The principle was most 
-19- ,_ 
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assuredly used in this case as well since a triple first 
degree murder conviction is at issue. Thus, under this quoted 
Stenback doctrine, respondent submits that the Court no 
doubt considered any affect_its Brown decision would have 
on the present case since Brown was filed nearly one 
week earlier than Andrews v. Morris, and both cases 
were under advisement at the same time. Since no Brown 
issues are mentioned in Andrews, presumably the Court 
considered none to exist and consequently affirmed the 
dismissal of appellant's petition for habeas corpus. 
Thus, the Stenback doctrine is a further bar to 
appellant's petition for rehearing. 
As to the asserted factually inaccurate testimony, 
appellant cites to page 4167 of the transcript wherein 
Allen Roe, a clinical psychologist at the Utah State 
Prison, was pressed by appellant Pierre's counsel to name 
three cases where a released inmate, who had been sentenced 
to life imprisonment on a first degree murder cc-viction, 
committed another murder. Mr. Roe, after protes~ing he 
could not be sure of his recollection, named three persons 
he believed fell into that category (Tr.4167). Whether 
or not the information Hr. Roe gave was accurate is not 
clear from the record. Assuming, arguendo, that it was 
inaccurate, respondent submits that the hard-pressed 
recollection is so collateral and irrelevant to the 
'·, 
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essential issues before the jury at that stage that 
it cannot be said to have prejudiced the jury as 
perhaps was the case in ~· This claim, therefore, 
must also be rejected. 
As to the jury instructions being inadequate 
in view of the Brown requirements, this Court recognized 
in Brown that State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977) · 
"was the first case involving capital offenses under the 
criminal code enacted in 1973 "(State v. Brown, note 15, 
page 14) and in that case (State v. Pierre) the court 
first established that the burden of proof in capital 
cases is that "the totality of aggravating circumstances 
must • • outweigh the totality of mitigating c::cc·uiTcstances·." 
Pierre, at 1347-1348. However, in analyzing the jury 
instructions' sufficiency as per the Pierre standard in 
the present case, this Court concluded: 
We believe the District Court's 
instruction thereon satisfied that 
requirement in this case. And ln our 
appellate review of this matter we 
conclude that the aggravating circumstances 
were overwhelmingly present against the 
defendant and the mitigating circumstances 
favoring him most minimal--even from the 
point of view of inference. 
572 P.2d at 1348 (emphasis added). This ruling completely 
forecloses any discussion regarding the jury instructions 
at penalty phase in this case. Such a specific holding 
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cannot be thwarted with an inferential reference to the 
Brown decision, decided more than two years after State 
v. Pierre. 
Finally, appellant again advances the theory 
that more time is needed to ensure the consistent 
application of capital punishment especially as per the 
Brown case. Respondent directs the Court's attention 
to the reference to Spinkellink v. Wainwright, supra at 
pages 12-13 of Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, and submits 
that this Court's adoption of the Spinkellink position is 
dispositive on this point. The State cannot be kept in 
abeyance in its application of the death penalty, waiting 
for further case law development in order to guarantee 
that all hypothetical contingencies are resolved. As 
Spinkellink notes, if this were done "[t)he process would 
be neverending and the benchmark for comparison would be 
chronically undefined." Id. at 605. 
In conclusion, respondent would emphasize that 
the fundamental, essential requirements of the major 
United States Supreme Court cases have been met here. 
The Furman requira~ent of minimizing jury arbitrariness has 
been satisfied. The Supreme Court standards do not require 
states to provide pure, surgically sterile proceedings, 
-22-
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devoid of all discretion, deliberative secrets and case-by-case 
inconsistency. The high Court requires that their pronounce-
ments, as previously discussed, be observed. That has 
been done here. 
Respondent suggests that the time has come to 
put an end to the moritorium on the death penalty 
presently in existence in the State of Utah. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT HAS ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED AND 
REJECTED APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT HE DID NOT 
INTEND TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF THE VICTIMS. 
As in Point II, respondent will summarize the 
issues appellant raises in his Point II and show where 
these have been exhaustively dealt with: 
1. appellant Andrews was not proven to have 
intended the death of the victims--State v. Andrews, 
574 P.2d at 710-711; Andrews v. Morris, appellant's 
amended petition for habeas corpus, at page 9; Andrews 
v. Morris, appellant's brief, at page 22; and 
Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed Feb. 13, 1980, at 
page 11. 
2. the Court dismissed the petition without 
reviewing the transcript--Andrews v. Morris, appellant's 
brief, at page 11; and Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed 
Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 7-8. 
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3. the mitigating evidence outweighed the 
aggravating evidence--Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed 
Feb. 13, 1980, at page 10. 
Respondent here again asserts the legal 
principles regarding petitions for rehearing as 
outlined supra in Point I. Since this present petition 
fails to meet these requirements on the issues raised 
in appellant's Point II, the petition for rehearing 
should be denied. 
Respondent will now comment on each of these 
issues in greater detail in chronological order as 
they appear in appellant's brief. First, appellant 
again asserts his supposed need for an evidentiary 
hearing. Here, however, this need is based on the 
proposition that "the difficulties of assessing the 
record" cannot be made "without a full hearing on it." 
Respondent disagrees. Such a hearing would solely 
attempt to develop factual issues which this Court 
determined were not even present since the issues are 
purely legal in nature and subject to dismissal as a matter 
of law as per Spinkellink and Andrews v. Morris, both 
supra. Furthermore, such an evidentiary hearing is 
unnecessary if, as a matter of law, the State is not 
required to specifically allege and prove that appellant 
Andrews intended the deaths of the victims beyond what 
was proven in this case. (See discussi6n of Lockett y. 
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Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), infra.) 
Appellant next complains that this Court's 
statement on page 10 of Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, as to the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence presented, is inaccurate. 
Respondent submits that given the tremendous weight of 
aggravating circumstances in this case, the Court's 
observation is correct. This Court has twice reviewed the 
record and has twice rejected appellant assertion of lack 
of intent as to the deaths of the victims. Appellant's 
characterization of the facts has simply not been accepted 
by the Court. 
The central issue in appellant's Point II involves 
the arguments made in the concurring opinio~ of Justice White 
in Lockett v. Ohio, supra. The Lockett case imrolved five 
persons in the murder-robbery of a pawnbroker. Petitioner 
Lockett, the getaway car driver, was convicted of aggravated 
murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to death. Her 
sentence was reversed on appeal because the Ohio statute 
under which she was sentenced did not give the sentencer 
enough discretion in considering mitigating factors of 
the criminal's character, circumstances of the offense, 
and like considerations. In a concurring opinion, Justice 
1-lhi te agreed with the plurality decision that this basic 
flaw in the statute was sufficient to reverse her death 
sentence, but also argued that her sentence should be 
'-. 
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reversed because she did not intend the death of the victim. 
He contended that: 
• it violates the Eighth 
Amendment to impose the penalty of 
death without a finding that the 
defendant possessed a purpose to 
cause the death of the victim." 
438 u.s. at 624. 
The defect in the Lockett case is not present 
here. Appellant Andrews' participation in this crime has 
been reviewed by this Court and found to be of the type 
required by Utah law to result in the death penalty. 
Appellant actively participated with appellant Pierre in 
torturing and murdering the helpless victims. He 
purposefully helped administer the Drano to the victims. 
His was not the passive participation of a getaway car 
driver. The facts of the trial speak for themselves, as 
was outlined by the State in its brief in opposition to 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in Andrews v. 
Utah. This statement of facts is helpful in response 
to appellant's claims here and is therefore set out in 
full in Appendix A for the Court's reference. This 
statement of facts shows that the two appellants acted in 
concert with each other in the commission of the murders. 
Much like one defendant stablizing a gun while the other 
pulls the trigger or one holding a victim secure while the 
other kills him, the two appellants both intended the murders 
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of the victims in this case. As to appellant's assertion 
that he "had argued with [Pierre] and left" before 
any of the shootings, such is not well-established by 
the evidence. Orren Walker merely stated that while 
lying face down on the floor, he did not hear appellant 
Andrews after a certain point. Appellant certainly 
did not provide evidence that he, in fact, left. 
Appellant concedes that the jury could properly 
find that Andrews remained with Pierre, yet somehow contends 
that appellant meets the Justice White test in Lockett of 
not intending the victim's deaths. Respondent urges 
that this interpretation is not sufficient to trigger 
Justice Whilte's Lockett rationale. In listt 2f ~he above 
facts of appellant's participation, more must be alleged 
than a weak contention that appellant left the room before 
Justice White's test can be applicable. Even if there was 
enough evidence to support Justice White's test, respondent 
would remind the Court that his opinion was not joined by 
any other justice and cannot be considered as binding 
Supreme Court law on its own. Justice Hhite concurred 
with the other justices in their opinion as to the defects 
in admission of mitigating evidence as the key factor in 
the reversal and then added his comments as to a co-defendant's 
necessary intent to kill a victim. Respondent agrees with 
Justice Stewart that Justice White's opinion "represents 
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only his views." Andrews v. Borris, at page 14, advance 
sheet. 
Horeover, respondent submits that this Lockett 
rationale is improperly raised here inasmuch as that 
case was decided subsequent to the present case's direct 
appeal. (For a complete discussion of the improper 
retroactive application of later case law, see Andrews v. 
Morris, No. 16168, brief of respondent, at pages 49-55, 
which respondent herein incorporates by this reference.) 
Finally, under Utah law it is implicit that the 
jury did find that appellant Andrews possessed a purpose 
or intended to cause the death of the victims. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) states that an actor commits first 
degree murder when he "intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of anoth~r." This requirement was set out 
explicitly to the jury in Jury Instruction No. 8 (R.35l), 
and the jury's return of the guilty verdict on three 
counts of first degree murder is proof that the jurors 
found that appellant met this requirement. This finding 
by the jury is further enforced by the fact that Utah 
case law requires that all evidence must be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the verdict. (See State v. lhlson, 
565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); State v. Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, 
499 P.2d 269 (1972); and State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 
422 P.2d 196 (1967).) 
'·. 
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for habeas corpus, at page 9; Andrews v. Borris, 
appellant's brief, at pages 22-23; and Andrews v. 
Morris, No. 16168, filed Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 11-12. 
Respondent makes these additional comments as 
to this issue. The method of execution claim was correctly 
disposed of by this court, as a matter of law, as per 
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), and its citation 
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976). The 
~Court analyzed the petitioner's claim that the 
punishment of death under all circumstances is cruel 
and unusual and ruled that this Eighth Amendment 
prohibition only forbids excessive or disproportionate 
penalties. In holding that the death penalty does not 
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the high 
Court acknowledged Utah's method of execution as being 
a permissible means of employing the death penalty. This 
recogn~tion of Utah's acceptable method is further 
illustrated by the Gary Gilmore case. (See, e.g., 
Bessie Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S.Ct. 436, 
50 L.Ed.2d 632 (1976), wherein the Court terminated 
a stay of execution; Codianna, et al. v. Utah, cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978), wherein this specific 
issue of Utah's method of execution was proffered as 
a violation of the Eighth Amendment, yet was not deemed 
'-. 
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of sufficient importance to merit the Court's analysis; 
and Andrews v. Utah, cert. denied 439 U.S. 882 (1978).) 
Respondent therefore urges that this issue has been 
well-considered and rejected by the Utah Court as well 
as the United States Supreme Court. Thus, a rehearing 
should not be granted on this issue. 
Respondent submits further that appellant's 
argument that Utah's methods of execution are constitutional 
due to "evolving standards of decency" (Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) is misplaced. Trop's oft-cited 
phrase must be analyzed in view of its facts. There 
the Court determined that the penalty of divested 
national citizenship for a soldier's desertion during 
war time was disproportionate and cruel and unusual. 
The imposition of the death penalty upon a convicted 
triple murderer has been determined already to be neither 
disproportionate nor cruel and unusual. The United 
States Supreme Court has not deemed Utah's method of 
execution to be in violation of the "evolving standards 
of decency" test in the three occasions it has had to 
do so. (See discussion supra.) 
The appellant's reliance on Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584 (1977), is likewise misplaced. In Coker, 
the Supreme Court determined that the imposition of the 
death penalty upon a defendant convicted of rape was a 
, __ 
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disproportionate sentence. Again respondent contends 
that the Coker facts and the facts herein clearly 
render the former's analysis inapplicable here. 
Again, appellant argues he must be granted 
an evidentiary hearing on the remotely collateral issues 
of the degree of pain and suffering Utah's death penalty 
will impose on appellant and the alleged Mormon doctrine· 
influence as the basis of the death penalty's penal 
purpose. Respondent reasserts the sound doctrine of 
Spinkellink and Andrews, both supra, as previously argued. 
No evidentiary hearing need be held to develop facts 
when the issues are legal and may be disposed of as a 
matter of law. Such principle is even more sound 
when the "facts" appellant seeks to have developed here 
do not even relate to the facts of the case. These 
"facts" are merely tangential, collateral after-thoughts 
which appellant now seeks to employ as the basis of a 
dilatory evidentiary hearing. Such a basis for a hearing 
cannot be allowed under the Spinkellink or Andrews decisions. 
Appellant cites two articles, written by the same 
author, as evidence of the "growing body of legal 
literature" which contends that hanging and shooting 
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition and that since 
the "sole purpose" of Utah's death penalty is to satisfy 
Mormon doctrine of "blood atonement" and "election of 
salvation" [sic?] the Utah death penal~Y is invalid. 
-32-
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submits that this red-herring argument is forcefully 
off-set by the United States Supreme Court rulings 
rejecting similar claims by Utah petitioners (see supra). 
In summary, this issue of cruel and unusual 
punishment has previously been considered and rejected 
by this Court. The United States Supreme Court has 
also rejected this claim. Thus, it cannot be used 
as a basis for a petition for rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The present petition for rehearing is defective 
for several reasons. Primarily, the requirements for 
granting a rehearing--issues, law or facts which have 
been overlooked or misconstrued by the court--have not been 
met. Specifically, the petition is defectlve because 
the majority of the issues raised have been previously 
raised, considered and either resolved or rejected. 
The Utah death penalty's constitutionality has 
been considered in earlier decisions of this Court and 
the application thereof is consistent with State v. Brown, 
supra. 
The contention that appellant Andrews did not 
intend the deaths of his victims has also been heretofore 
analyzed and resolved in respondent's favor. 
Finally, the claim that Utah's death penalty 
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
'·. 
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and unusual punishment has been considered previously 
by this Court and such claim was rejected. 
Respondent submits that the recent decision 
by this Court in Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed 
Feb. 13, 1980, was correct and that a rehearing is not 
merited. Respondent prays that the present petition 
for rehearing be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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APPENDIX A 
FROM THE STATE OF UTAH'S BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI IN 
ANDREWS V. UTAH 
STATEHENT OF THE CASE 
On April 22, 1974, the basement of the Hi Fi Shop 
in downtown Ogden, Utah, became the scene of a brutal and 
torturous detention, robbery and murder which left three 
people dead and two wounded but miraculously alive. 
Stanley Walker, assistant manager of the Hi Fi 
Shop, in his early twenties; a nineteen year old employee 
and part-time model, Michelle Ansley; and Cortney Naisbitt, 
a seventeen year old relative of the shop's owner; were 
taken captive at gunpoint into the basement of the Hi Fi Shop 
by petitioners Pierre and Andrews (Tr.3069-3070), to facilitate 
the methodical removal of virtually the entire inventory of 
stereo equipment from the store for transport to a rented 
storage locker. 
Stanley's father, Orren lvalker, became alarmed 
when Stanley did not come home for dinner (Tr.3060-3061). 
His paternal concern led him to the Hi Fi Shop as he sought 
the whereabouts of his son (Tr.30nl,3063,3067). The back 
door of the Shop \vas unlocked. He entered and saw that 
much of the stereo equip~ent which had been on display 
earlier that afternoon was now missing (Tr.3064-3065). 
As he approached the stairway to the Shop's basement, 
petitioners confronted him with guns, and forced him down 
'-. 
the stairs. Orren found the three young people lying on 
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the floor, bound hand and foot, pleading with petitioners 
for their lives (Tr.3073-3075). Petitioner Pierre tried 
to force Orren to give some unknown drink to the young 
people (Tr.3077). When Orren tacitly refused, petitioner 
Andrews placed a gun at his head threatening him (Tr.3077-
3078). Petitioners then tied Orren's hands and feet, and 
placed him by the others (Tr.3078-3079). 
Like Orren 1-ialJ;er, Carol Naisbi tt became concerned 
about her son, Cortney, \-.'hen he failed to return home from 
an errand (Tr.2540-2541,2080-2081). She sought her son 
at the Hi Fi Shop at about 8:00p.m. (Tr.l771-1772,2541). 
Petitioners captured her at gunpoint and laid her bound 
next to her son (Tr3080-3081,3083). 
Eventually, in front of the others, petitioners 
compelled Carol Naisbitt to drink a caustic substance, which 
I 
caused her to cough and sputter (Tr.3084-3085). The substance was 
later identified as sodium hydroxide, a chemical compound consiste:~ 
with liquid Drano (Tr.2208-2210). In turn Cortney, 
Stanley, Michelle, and Orren were also forced to drink 
(Tr.3085-3087). Each successive ingestion caused coughing 
and spitting, yet petitioner Andrews continued to pour and 
petitioner Pierre continued to administer the corrosive 
chemical (Tr.3084-3085). Orren Walker, one of the two 
survivors, tried to let the chemical slowly drain unnoticed 
out of his mouth (Tr.3087); his forehead became scarred froM 
lying in the resulting pool. Apparently to ensure that 
the Drane did its desired work, petitioners now covered 
each victim's mouth with tape (Tr.3087-308~). 
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Time passed but the five lived on. Finally, 
petitioner Pierre shot Carol Naisbitt in the head while she 
lay next to her son (Tr.3101-3084). Cortney fell next 
victim to Pierre's gun, also shot in the head (Tr.3103). Orren 
Walker then heard a bullet strike the floor near his head 
(Tr.3101). Next, Orren heard his own son shot by Pierre 
(Tr.3102). Another bullet "stung" into Orren's head (Tr. 
3103). He began to do simple mental multiplication and to 
move his toes and fingers to determine how bad his wound 
was (Tr.3103,3105). Pierre left momentarily, and Orren 
heard Michelle ask his son Stanley if he were all right 
(Tr.3102); Stanley \''as able to reply that he had been shot 
(Tr. 3102). 
Pierre returned, unti~d Michelle who had not been 
shot and took her into a back room (Tr.3103-3104), while 
Orre:r!:eisned death (Tr.3105). 1\hen she was returned she 
was naked, raped (Tr.3106,3110). (The State medical examiner 
determined .sexual intercourse, post mort urn. Tr. 217 6-2179.) 
Michelle lay back down at her appointed place and was herself 
shot in the back of the head by Pierre (Tr.3109-3110). 
Stanley was then shot a final time; his breathing, which his 
father, Orren, had been able to hear up to that time, now 
ceased (Tr.3110). 
Later petitioner Pierre tried to discern if Orren 
Walker was dead (Tr.3112). He attempted to strangle Orren with 
an electrical cord (Tr.3110,3ll9). Only by carefully tensing 
the muscles of his neck was Orren able to survive the strangula-
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tion attempt while still playing dead (Tr.3110). The cord was 
left so tightly tied, his head swelled (Tr.3119). Orren then 
felt a pointed object shoved into his ear and kicked three 
times (Tr.3111,3113). The object was a long ballpoint pen 
(Tr.3124). Somehow Orren was able to keep from flinching as 
he felt the pen go deeper and deeper with each kick (Tr.3112, 
3113). Finally, both assailants were gone. 
After some time, Orren heard the voice of his other 
son upstairs (Tr.3116), and the hours of immediate terror 
were over. The entire episode had lasted approximately four 
hours. Michelle and Stanley lay dead (Tr.3120); Carol Naisbitt 
died en route to the hospital (Tr.2543,3120). Cortney survived 
to face five weeks of coma (Tr.2546), five months of intensive 
care (Tr.2551), several operations (Tr.2544-2545,2548-2549, 
2551), peritonitis (Tr.2550), blindness of the right eye (Tr. 
2552-2553), partial paralysis of his right side (Tr.2547-2548, 
2552-2553), and loss of pa~~ of his esophagcs and stomach 
lining (Tr.2549-2551). As of the trial date, November, 1974, he 
was still hospitalized, and except for water and clear liquids 
was being fed directly into the stomach (Tr.2552). Orren 
Walker also survived to give his eye-witness testimony at 
the trial (Tr.3057-3136). 
Besides the personal account of Orren Walker, 
witness after witness corroborated his testimony and 
implicated petitioners. 
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One witness overheard Andrews two months prior to 
the crime state that someday he would like to rob a "hi .fi" 
shop and would kill anyone who got in his way (Tr.l549). 
Two witnesses saw both petitioners together in the Hi Fi 
Shop two days before the robbery-murder writing prices down 
and looking all over the store, even down the back stairs 
(Tr.l578-1580,1588,1591-1592). 
The owner of the rented storage locker in which 
the stereo items were found specifically identified Pierre 
as the person who had rented that particular locker the 
morning of the crime, supposedly to store a car (Tr.l665-1670). 
Over $20,000.00 worth of stereo equipment was recovered from 
the storage locker which also contained a bottle of liquid 
Drano, a cup like that used to administer the poison at the 
scene, and personal ite1ns from the shop. Much o:= the equipment 
viaS identified by specific serial number as having come from 
the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.2447,2865-2885,2936-2955). Personal items 
like a one-of-a-kind sculpture, a towel purchased in Brazil, 
a piece of broken display moulding and chairs were specifically 
identified as corning fro~ the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.2917-2919). 
A black acquaintance of petitioners' codefendant, 
Keith Roberts (who was convicted of aggravated robbery but 
not the homicides), saw petitioners exit Andrews' blue van 
about 5:30 p.m. on the evening of the murders, three quarters 
of a block east of the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.l688,1700-1703). 
Petitioners walked in the direction of the Shop while the 
\·J.n made u U-turn und drove t!Jat sC~me direction (Tr.l?00-1703). 
'-. 
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Another witness also saw petitioners exit the blue van and 
walk in the direction of the shop (Tr.l689-1690). 
Another witness saw Andrews' blue van backed up 
to the rear door of the Hi Fi Shop about 6:30 p.m. and two 
black men passing stereo equipment into it (Tr.l828-1830). 
Another witness saw Carol Naisbitt enter the back of the 
shop about 8:00 p.m. and specifically identified Pierre 
as being at the back of the Shop somewhat later (Tr.l771-
1772). Pierre asked the witness a question and she remembered 
his accent (Tr.l721). Other witnesses mentioned Pierre's 
Trinidad accent (Tr.l593,1667,3294). 
While looking for empty deposit bottles, the day 
after the crime, two young boys found purses, wallets, credit 
cards and other personal effects of the victims in the trash 
dumpster outside of petitioners' barracks at Hill Air Force 
Base (Tr.2121-2129,2136-2138). 
A search of Pierre's room at the barracks the day 
after the crime yielded the signed copy of the storage 
locker rental agreement, and articles from the Hi Fi Shop 
(Tr.2467,2473-2575). Andrews' room also contained Orren 
Walker's watchband (Tr.3053-3055,3096), items from the 
Hi Fi Shop (Tr.2582-2588), and surgical gloves (Tr.2583). 
(At one time, Orren Walker had heard sounds like rubber 
gloves corning from petitioners' direction. Tr.3094-3095.) 
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Petitioners gave a portable cassette player to a 
girl to "hold"; the stereo was from the Hi Fi Shop and 
contained Orren l~alker's watch (Tr.2322-2323,2427,2940,3097). 
Three vleeks prior to the crime Pierre was. even seen 
at the movie "Magnum Force" a scene from which depicis a 
pimp pouring Drane dow:1 a prostitute's throat to kill her 
(Tr .1614-1615). 
On November 15, 1974, petitioners Here found guilty on 
three counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of 
aggravated robbery; the guilt phase of the bifurcated capital 
proceeding was concluded. 
During the sentencing phase of Utah's bifurcated 
capital proceeding, the State called Dr. Louis G. Moench 
(Tr.4130), who had given petitioner Pierre a psychiatric 
examination on October 14, 1974 (Tr.4130-4135). The doctor 
concluded that petitioner Pierre was able to distinguish 
both legally and morally between right and v7rong and suffered 
from no mental defect or illness which would interfere with 
his ability to make decisions or to conform his actions to 
what he perceived to be right or wrong. Dr. Moench also 
stated that petitioner Pierre was of average intelligence 
(Tr. 4136-4137). 
Lt. John Farrer Regni (Tr.4138) was called by the 
State to testify concerning petitioners' military 
records. Pierre's record revealed that he had wrongfully 
appropriated an automobile from another airman (Tr.4152), 
had failed to report to duty on several occasions (Tr.4153), 
had twice written checks with insufficient funds (Tr.4153), 
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and \vas a "marginal performer" with limited potential as an 
airman (Tr.4155). Petitioner Andrews' military record reflected 
a court-martial and time lost, a letter of reprimand for 
leaving the scene of an accident (Tr.4142), another letter of 
I 
reprimand for leaving his appointed place of duty (Tr.4143), and 
that he had t\.,.,ice failed to go to his appointed place of duty. 
Petitioner Andre\vS was listed as a marginal performer and 
of limited potential as an airman (Tr.4146). 
The state also called Mr. Allan Roe, a clinical 
psychologist at the Utah State Prison. Hr. Roe stated that 
during the past eight years, ten persons serving life 
sentences for first degree murder had been released from 
the Utah State Prison. The persons released had served an 
average of thirteen years, one month (Tr.4165), with the longest 
serving seventeen years, and the shortest !line years, one month 
(Tr.4171). He also stated that three of .those released there-
after co!T'mi ttcd other r,mrdcrs. 
Petitioners Pierre and Andrews then presented 
evidence of mitigating circumstances. Mr. Gerald Smith, 
Ph.d:, a professor of criminology at the University of Utah, 
stated that in his opinion, the death penalty is not a 
deterrent (Tr.4197-4234). 
Mr. Frazier Crocker, Jr., former chaplain at the Utah 
State Prison, gave a historical overview of capital punish-
ment, and stated that in his opinion, biblical text did not 
support the imposition of capital punishment (Tr.4234-4247). 
'·. 
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Petitioner Andrews then testified that he was twenty 
years old; he was the youngest child in a family of five boys 
and one girl; he had never known his father and his mother had 
supported the family; he had run away from home when he·was 
ten years old; he was taken away from his parents and reared by 
an aunt and uncle until he was fifteen; he had received an 
eighth grade education; he again ran away from home at age 
fifteen and burglarized a cafe; he was in a juvenile detention 
center for one year and four months; he then joined the Job 
Corps where he received a general education diploma (equivalent 
to graduation from high school) and a welding certificate; he 
pled guilty to auto theft in San Antonio, Texas, and was placed 
on probation; and then joined the Air Force (Tr.424~-4270). 
Petitioner Pierre did not take the stand or present 
further evidence of mitigating circumstances in his case. 
The trial judge carefully charged the jury concerning 
their responsibilities during the sentencing proceeding. He 
stated that the burden of proof necessary to satisfy the 
jury that a death sentence was appropriate "'as on the State 
(Tr.4273). He further stated that all evidence received 
during the guilt phase of the proceeding could be considered 
by the~, as well as evidence presented during the sent~ncing 
proceeding. The jury was also instructed to consider the 
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circumstances of the crime, the character of each defendant, 
his background, his general personal history, and his mental 
and physical condition (Tr.4274). The trial judge also 
enumerated for the jury the statutory mitigating circumstances 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Tr.4274-4275). 
The jury determined that this was a proper case for 
the imposition of the death penalty and sentenced petitioners 
to death. The convictions and sentences were subsequently 
affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d ' 
1338 (Utah 1977), and State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977). 
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